DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 286 602 PS 016 793

AUTHOR Keller, Monika; And Others
TITLE The Conception of Preconventional Morality: Some Further Doubts.
PUB DATE May 87
NOTE 28p.; Paper presented at the Annual Symposium of the Jean Piaget Society (17th, Philadelphia, PA, May 28-30, 1987).
PUB TYPE Reports - Research/Technical (143) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Children; *Cognitive Development; Foreign Countries; *Moral Development; Punishment; Theories
IDENTIFIERS *Fairness; Iceland; Kohlberg (Lawrence); *Moral Reasoning; Theory Development

ABSTRACT

A study was made to follow up on questions about the conception of preconventional moral reasoning in Kohlberg's cognitive development theory. Based on earlier findings, the following hypotheses were formulated: (1) children will express genuine fairness and interpersonal concerns at the level of preconventional moral reasoning; (2) while children's moral reasoning at stage 1 may be characterized by unilateral respect for rules or unquestioned rule obedience, a punishment orientation will not be a predominant concern; and (3) moral reasoning at stage 2 cannot be explained exclusively by the model of instrumental exchange; children's arguments will show genuine concern for the welfare of others and an acceptance of moral rules which have the purpose of protecting the psychological well-being of others. Participants were 65 urban Icelandic children aged 7, 9, and 12 years, who were presented with a modification of Kohlberg's classical Judy dilemma. Findings supported the contention that genuine interpersonal and fairness concerns are present at the preconventional level; refuted the assumption of a punishment orientation in the young child; and supported the idea of an unquestioned respect for rules. It is concluded that the findings present a serious challenge to the basic theoretical assumptions underlying Kohlberg's theory of moral development. (RH)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
X This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy

THE CONCEPTION OF PRECONVENTIONAL MORALITY.

SOME FURTHER DOUBTS.

ED286602

Monika Keller, Sigrún Adalbjarnardóttir and Karin v. Rosén
Max Planck Institute of Human Development and Educational Research (Berlin) and Harvard University.

This research follows up on questions about the conception of preconventional moral reasoning in Kohlberg's cognitive development theory. 60 subjects are assessed (20 each age 7, 9 and 12) with Kohlberg's Judy-dilemma.

Results support the contention that at the preconventional level genuine interpersonal and fairness concerns are evidenced at the preconventional level which function as precourses of the interpersonal normative morality constituting Stage 3.

Our findings indicate that even when reasoning about a Kohlberg moral dilemma children at the preconventional level use genuine fairness arguments as well as arguments of concern for the welfare of others. Thus, Kohlberg's system does not account for a dimension of interpersonal loyalty that is a part of moral reasoning from early on.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Monika Keller
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

PS 016793

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Monika Keller, Sigrun Adalbjarnardóttir

and Karin von Rosen

The conception of preconventional morality: some further doubts

In recent years there has been a growing interest in the structure of the early stages of moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1969, 1976, 1981) following Piaget (1965/1932) emphasized the physicalistic aspect of an adult-authoritarian orientation in preconventional reasoning at the first stage of development. According to this, children are seen as judging behaviors out of a unilateral respect for the sacredness of adult rules. Adult rewards and punishments are taken as major cues for the judgment of actions as morally right or wrong. Correspondingly, avoidance of punishment serves as a predominant motive for upholding moral rules. The second stage of preconventional reasoning in Kohlberg's theory is characterized by an instrumental exchange orientation. The moral rightness of acts is justified with a predominant concern for the self's interests. Other's needs, interests and welfare are taken into account only as far as they affect advantages or disadvantages to oneself. Thus, in Kohlberg's conceptualization of stages of moral reasoning the emergence of genuine moral feelings, empathy and concerns for the welfare of others is viewed as an achievement of the conventional level of morality.

Contrary to the controversy about the higher stages of Kohlberg's model, the stages of early moral reasoning have been taken rather for granted. Snarey (1985; Edwards, 1986) supplies evidence for the cross-cultural validity of the models's basic assumptions. Yet a closer look at the research in this field (see also Rest, 1983) shows that most studies in the Kohlberg tradition have been concerned with the higher stages of conventional and postconventional reasoning. This holds true for Kohlberg's longitudinal study as well (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs et al. 1983). The study by Gibbs & Wideman (1982) is one of the few studies which elaborates on the preconventional stages. While their approach is distinct from Kohlberg's in using written material - a method which can be questioned in its adequacy for young children - their results basically confirm Kohlberg's model of preconventional reasoning.

Outside of the Kohlbergian tradition, studies of moral reasoning in young children have increasingly raised doubts about the general validity of the basic assumptions underlying the conception of preconventional moral reasoning in Kohlberg's theory. One such criticism centers upon the punishment orientation in young children's moral reasoning. This is debated by Siegel (1982) and Turiel (1983). Turiel (1983) questions Kohlberg's contention that children confuse morality with prudence in defining the rightness or wrongness of an action by punishment. Rather, punishment can be seen as the consequence of the moral transgression. Similarly, Jensen & Hughston's (1973) study indicates that children as young as four to

five years of age judge moral transgressions as being bad irrespective of whether the act is punished or rewarded. Secondly, Turiel (1978) and Nucci & Turiel (1978) question Piaget's and Kohlberg's claim of the child's unilateral respect for adult rules. Their studies indicate that young children judge moral transgressions to be wrong even in the absence of governing rules. Therefore, Turiel (1983) claims that young children's moral reasoning is based on the intrinsic effect an action has upon the well-being (welfare) of others.

The genuine concern of young children for other's welfare is also indicated by studies from Eisenberg (1979, 1982; Eisenberg et al., 1985). Children at the ages of four and five rarely refer to punishment or authorities when justifying prosocial moral behavior. Rather, they show an empathic concern for other's physical and psychological needs. This result is consistent with Damon's (1983) findings for young children's distributive justice reasoning. Theoretically, Hoffman (1976, 1984) argued for the importance of empathy and altruism in moral development. This idea has been recently emphasized by Gilligan & Wiggins (1986) who suggest that the experience of attachment to others profoundly affects the child's understanding of how one should act toward other people.

In a series of studies we followed up on this ongoing controversy, findings by Keller (1984; Keller & Edelstein, 1985; Edelstein & Keller, 1985; Keller, Edelstein & Sigurdardóttir, in preparation) evidenced that on the one hand, children

around the age of seven express a non-questioned rule orientation when reasoning about promise-keeping in a friendship, while a concern with punishment as motive for upholding the rule is practically absent. On the other hand, genuine moral or fairness concerns as well as non-instrumental concerns about the relationship are expressed in the age groups between 7 and 12 years. Based on these findings we argued against the contention in Kohlberg's theory that moral reasoning about fairness issues at the preconventional stage 2 level can be characterized as an exclusive instrumental exchange (Colby, Kohlberg et al., 1987). Other authors argue however that children's moral arguments at this stage seem to reflect the process of affective bonding to others and their growing awareness of what it means morally to stand in a relationship (see Youniss, 1980). These results were confirmed in a further study by Keller, Eckensberger & von Rosen (1986) using a classical Kohlberg dilemma (Judy dilemma) to assess moral reasoning in 12 and 15 year olds. Even when utilizing a prototypical Kohlbergian fairness dilemma only 53 % of arguments could be scored according to the criterion judgments given in the Standard Scoring Manual for the preconventional level.

The study presented here follows up on questions which could not be fully answered by the Keller, Eckensberger & von Rosen study. The study of older age groups did not allow us to explore whether stage 1 punishment and obedience as well as stage 2 instrumental exchange arguments occur more

frequently in early compared to middle childhood. Yet contrary to Turiel's (1983) findings, we expect that the younger children will show a substantative amount of rule obedience. Since we are exploring the understanding of psychological rules (i.e., promise-keeping or truth telling) compared to rules relating to physical well-being (e.g., hitting) we expect that the awareness of the meaning of these rules will depend on social cognitive abilities which are not yet available to the young children. Therefore, we posit a crucial and qualitative difference between the type of moral rules assessed by Turiel and the type of psychological rules assessed by Kohlberg. While the first type of moral rule requires an awareness of the consequences of an action for another's physical well-being, the latter requires an individual to first understand the obligatoriness of a verbal statement (to promise) and second to assess the consequences of rule-violation with regard to the psychological welfare for others.

Concluding from our earlier results the following hypotheses are formulated:

1. Children will express genuine fairness and interpersonal concerns at the level of preconventional moral reasoning.

2. While children's moral reasoning at stage 1 may be characterized by unilateral respect for rules or unquestioned rule obedience, a punishment orientation will not represent a predominant concern.

3. Moral reasoning at stage 2 cannot be explained exclusively by the model of instrumental exchange. Rather, children's

arguments will show genuine concern for the welfare of others and an acceptance of moral rules in order to protect the psychological well-being of others.

Method

Subjects and interview

Our analysis is based on a cross-sectional random sample of 65 urban children aged 7, 9 and 12 years (distributed into groups of 20, 20, and 25 with 10/12 females and 10/13 males respectively).[1]

Subjects were presented with a slight modification of Kohlberg's Judy dilemma in which a mother has given a promise to the daughter (Jona) to let her go to a rock concert with the money the daughter earned herself. In the last minute the mother withdraws her permission requesting the money in order to buy things necessary for school. The daughter decides to lie about the money she earned and to go anyhow. On the critical day the sister (Lilja), who knows about this, is asked by the mother where the other daughter is. Questions refer to the moral reasoning about the chosen decision and the alternative, to promise-keeping, property rules, the sibling and authority relationships as well as about consequences of choice(s) and strategies of conflict resolution.

Scoring was carried out by two independent raters consulting the Standard Issue Scoring Manual Forms A and B (Colby,

[1] This research is part of the Project Child Development and Social Structure carried out by the Center of Development and Socialization in the Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education in West Berlin.

Kohlberg et al., 1987) for each sample independently. The interrater reliability of this scoring procedure was tested for utilizing 50 interviews from a total of 240 interviews from a longitudinal study presently being carried out at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education in West Berlin showing 80 to 90 % agreement for 12 and 15 year old samples.

Results

The analysis of the data shows that a substantial amount of morally relevant arguments (66 %) could not be matched to the Criterion Judgments in the Standard Issue Scoring Manual (Colby, Kohlberg et al., 1987). This holds true even after consulting the scoring manual regarding score criteria for the parallel Joe-dilemma as well as the Heinz-dilemma. More importantly, the efforts to classify and score these alternative arguments as supplementary content units in accordance with the preconventional stage structural criteria and definitions represent a significant challenge to and extension of the Kohlbergian theoretical conception of these earlier stages.

Although many of these alternative arguments reflect content areas forseen by the Kohlberg model from Stage 3 onward, e.g., concerns for non-instrumental or emphatic relations to others, interpersonal welfare, moral rules, or conscience (cf. Table 1), we argue that they represent sociomoral structures of a simpler preconventional type. In accordance with the theoretical guidelines outlined for the sociomoral perspec-

tives (Kohlberg, 1984) these arguments do not yet require a mutual third person perspective which is the prerequisite for criterion judgments at the conventional level. A quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis of our data serve to exemplifying this point.

1. Quantitative analysis

Figure 1 presents a preliminary verification of the stability of our classification procedure: The stage distributions of all 3 samples demonstrate an expected age-specific spread.

In examining the proportion of "Kohlberg" Criterion Judgments versus alternative content units across the 3 samples it was interesting to note a sequence from mostly alternative arguments in the earliest age group to a more even distribution of "Kohlberg" and alternative arguments in middle childhood. Figure 2 illustrates a rather unbalanced relationship of 27 % Kohlberg type arguments to 73 % non-Kohlberg arguments within the 7 year old sample, an emerging shift in the 9 year old sample with 34 % to 66 % and a more evenly weighted distribution of 47 % Kohlberg arguments to 53 % alternative content units demonstrated by the 12 year old sample.

This trend can also be observed in the stage relevant distribution of "Kohlberg" versus alternative arguments presented in Figure 3. A shift from the predominance of alternative arguments in the earlier stages (cf. Stage 1; 7 yrs.) towards a more even representation of both types of arguments when approaching Stage 3 (cf. Stage 2/3; 12 yrs) is suggested

in this breakdown.

2. Qualitative analysis

The qualitative analysis of the arguments which could not be scored in Kohlberg's system (cf. Table 1) indicates that in addition to traditional Kohlbergian criterion judgments a consistent expression of Moral Rule/Conscience and Relationship concerns were demonstrated in all three samples across both preconventional stages observed. This holds true when arguing about sibling as well as authority relationships. These supplementary arguments did not fit the content aspects of the preconventional stages, but are in keeping with the theoretical guidelines outlined for the sociomoral perspectives of these stages (cf. Kohlberg, 1984).

With regard to Stage 1, physical sanctions in terms of punishment play a minimal role while absolute obedience to either undifferentiated, global rules or authority constitutes a predominant type of reasoning (e.g., reference to absolute, unquestioned obedience to rules, parents, sibling or God). On the other hand, stereotypical evaluations (it is bad, it is not nice, it is not good to lie) which subjects are unable to justify further frequently occur.

Already at Stage 1/2 the awareness of psychological consequences of rule violation begins to function as a moral reason (e.g., mother and daughter or siblings may have problems, may quarrel or become 'bad friends' or enemies); undifferentiated internalized concpetions of moral norms (e.g., wanting to tell truth, keeping a promise because a promise is a promise

or because you'll have bad dreams) and non-instrumental concerns for the relationship and the welfare of other persons (e.g., not tell mother because they are sisters or keeping promises because then everything will be so much better).

At Stage 2 the "classical" type of instrumental "tit for tat" reasoning does not play the predominant role in moral reasoning. This type of justification appears subordinate to genuine moral and interpersonal concerns emerging at this stage (e.g., fairness/fidelity: it is unfair of mother to break her promise, one should stand by a promise, shouldn't betray it; conscience: may feel this is better, most right or betraying makes you feel badly afterwards; relationship: because she is fond of or cares for her sister or mother, it's unpleasant for sister or mother, makes her sister or mother unhappy, sad or angry.)

Finally at Stage 2/3 generalized functional normative and mutual interpersonal concerns begin to emerge more in keeping with the Kohlberg tradition. However, in addition to supplementary examples of the foreseen transitional concerns with normative concepts (e.g., keeping promises is important to keep your friends or because others won't believe or trust you again), we observed an emerging genuine commitment of the self to generalized normative concerns (e.g., bound to keeping one's promise), moral feelings and conscience (e.g., mother will feel she had not done right and talk of her feelings, Jona will feel badly inside if she realizes she disobeyed, or clears her conscience not to lie) and interpersonal concerns

(e.g., need to talk to each other, help take care or watch out for her sister, or others are hurt if she breaks her promise). These arguments are not yet Stage 3 in that they do not represent the complex perspective coordination of mutual intentions of actions nor a full understanding of stereotypical good roles or models in terms of the Stage 3 Golden Rule ideal as exemplified in an example from the scoring manual; tell mother to get her to understand that she was selfish or to get her to understand Judy's reasons for lying and see the situation from her point of view.

Discussion

The results of this study in connection with the critical findings of the research mentioned in the introduction represent a serious challenge to the basic theoretical assumptions underlying Kohlberg's theory of moral development. In this theory the preconventional level is characterized by the following criteria: a) Rules and expectations are outside the self, b) the perspectives of persons are individualistic and isolated and c) coordinated through the basic mechanisms of instrumental exchange. It is the conventional level at which the perspective of an enduring relationship emerges and morality becomes internalized. This view of a shift from externality to internality is a frequent assumption in socialization theory.

While our results clearly refute the assumption of a punishment orientation in the young child, they support the idea of an unquestioned respect for rules. Thus, regarding

the psychological moral rules assessed here, the intrinsic effects of an action on the psychological well-being of others cannot be inferred at the first stage of development. Yet, already beginning at the transitional level between Stages 1 and 2 we can observe a rudimentary understanding of psychological consequences as a motive for the upholding of moral rules. At the second stage social cognitive abilities are available which allow a fully elaborated empathic understanding of psychological consequences of norm violations for others concerned. The genuine normative and interpersonal concerns evidenced at this stage are inconsistent with the instrumental exchange model found in Kohlberg's data. The arguments given here fit the description of Stage 3 reasoning in content but not in terms of structural complexity. They clearly transcend the individualistic and isolated perspective which is seen as characteristic of Stage 2 in Kohlberg's model. Rather, persons are seen as standing in relationships in which the actions of one person affect the psychological well-being of the other (Youniss, 1980). Consequently, the awareness of psychological consequences of norm violation in the sense of preventing harm to others serves as a fundamental moral motive.

Presently we cannot report to what extent these data are specific to the Icelandic society. Yet, if they are indeed culture bound, they still present a case against the universality of the preconventional stages in Kohlberg's theory. Our study furthermore shows that within a complex field such as moral

development the exclusive reliance on a preset scoring system serves the non-intended function to inhibit further development of the theory. It seems that openness and not closure is needed for future research.

References

Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., Gibbs, J., & Lieberman, M. (1983). A longitudinal study of moral judgment. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 48, Nos. 1-2.

Colby, A., Kohlberg, L., & collaborators (1987). The measurement of moral judgment. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Damon, W. (1977). The social world of the child. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Damon, W. (1983). Social and personality development. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Edelstein, W., & Keller, M. (1985). Fairness and care: A contradiction? In C. J. Brainerd, & V. F. Reyna (Eds.), Developmental Psychology (pp. 325-342). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers B.V.

Edwards, C. (1981). The comparative study of the development of moral judgment and reasoning. In R. Munroe, R. Munroe, & B. Whiting (Eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural human development (pp. 501-525). New York: Garland.

Eisenberg, N., & Neal, C. (1979). Children's moral reasoning about their own spontaneous prosocial behavior. Developmental Psychology, 15, 228-229.

Eisenberg, N. (1982). The development of reasoning regarding prosocial behavior. In N. Eisenberg (Ed.), The development of prosocial behavior. New York: Academic Press.

Eisenberg, N., Boehnke, K., Silbereisen, R. K., & Schuler, H. (1985). The development of prosocial behavior and cognitions. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 16, 69-82.

Gibbs, J. C., & Widaman, K. F. (1982). Social intelligence. Measuring the development of sociomoral reflection. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Gilligan, C., & Wiggins, G. (1986). The origins of morality in early childhood relationships. Unpublished manuscript.

Hoffman, M. (1976). Empathy, role-taking, guilt, and development of altruistic motives. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior (pp. 124-143). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Hoffman, M. (1984). Empathy, its limitations, and its role in a comprehensive moral theory. In W. Kurtines, & J. Gewirtz, Morality, moral behavior, and moral development. New York: Wiley.

Jensen, L. C., & Hughston, K. (1973). The relationship between type of sanction, story content, and children's judgments which are independent of sanction. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 122, 49-54.

Keller, M. (1984). Resolving conflicts in friendship. The development of moral understanding in everyday life. In W. Kurtines, & J. Gewirtz (Eds.), Morality, moral behavior, and moral development. New York: Wiley.

Keller, M., & Edelstein, W. (1985, June). Reasoning about promise-keeping: The early development of interpersonal-moral concern. Paper presented at the 15th Annual Symposium of the Jean Piaget Society, Philadelphia, NJ.

Keller, M., Edelstein, W., & Sigurdardôttir, G. (in preparation). Promise keeping in friendship: The development of interpersonal moral concerns. Unpublished manuscript.

Keller, M., Eckensberger, L., & von Rosen, K. (1986, July), Action theory and the structure of moral stages: The case of stage 2. Paper presented at the International Conference on Cross-Cultural Psychology, Istanbul, Turkey.

Kohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and research (pp. 374-480). New York: Rand McNally.

Kohlberg, L. (1976). Moral stages and moralization. In T. Lickona (Ed.), Moral development and behavior (pp. 31-53). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Kohlberg, L. (1981). The philosophy of moral development: Essays on moral development. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Kohlberg, L. (1984). Essays on moral development, vol. 2: The psychology of moral development. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Nucci, L., & Turiel, E. (1978). Social interactions and the development of social concepts in preschool children. Child Development, 49, 400-407.

Piaget, J. (1965/1932). The moral judgment of the child. New York: The Free Press.

Rest, J. R. (1983). Morality. In P. H. Mussen (Ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. 3. New York: Wiley.

Siegal, M. (1982). Fairness in children: A social-cognitive approach to the study of moral development. London: Academic Press.

Snarey, J. R. (1985). Cross-cultural universality of social-moral development: A critical review of Kohlbergian review. Psychological Bulletin, 97, 202-232.

Turiel, E. (1978). The development of concepts of social structure: social convention. In J. Glick, & A. Clarke-Stewart (Eds.), Personality and social development, vol. 1. New York: Gardner Press.

Turiel, E. (1983). Domains and categories in social cognitive development. In W. Overton (Ed.), The relationship between social and cognitive development. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Weston, D., & Turiel, E. (1980). Act-rule relations: Children's concepts of social rules. Developmental Psychology, 16, 417-424.

Youniss, J. (1980). Parents and peers in social development. Chicago: University Press.

Table 1

Examples of Moral Arguments (Content Units)

Observed in 7, 9, and 12 year old
Icelandic Samples (N = 65)

STAGE 1: physical sanctions & absolute, undifferentiated obedience to power/authority, hedonistic gratification

KOHLBERG CRITERION JUDGMENTS:

- lying is bad, you'd be a liar
- you would get punished, hit
- mother is boss, bigger, stronger

ALTERNATIVE CONTENT UNITS:

Individualistic/Hedonistic Concerns:

- not think about this any more, forget it
- she wants to go also, OR, it's no fun

Moral Rule Concerns:

- it is not nice/not good to lie
- should tell because she wasn't allowed to go
- should not lie
- should just obey
- just because
- has to, must do it

Relationship Concerns (authority/sibling):

- siblings shouldn't fight, tease, hit, pinch, pull, hair
- sister is bigger, stronger
- siblings always play together
- obey because God or parents own you

STAGE 1/2: psychological consequences, automatic stereotypical or global/undifferentiated reference to authority relationships, global concern for norms and interpersonal welfare

KOHLBERG CRITERION JUDGMENTS:

- Lilja might get into trouble, or punished, or scolded
- Judy might get scolded or punished

ALTERNATIVE CONTENT UNITS:

Moral Rule/Conscience Concerns:

- a promise is a promise
- she doesn't want to lie
- parents decide so children won't spend their money on nonsense
- keep a promise, OR, not fool/lie because you will have bad dreams
- Lilja feels better telling the right thing
- Lilja feels badly/sulks and doesn't know what to say
- it is irreligious to lie
- a lie/promise is a sin/rule and a sin/rule is a sin/rule
- God wants that, thinks it's not nice/sad

Relationship Concerns (authority/sibling):

- Lilja doesn't want to do what parents say
- Judy/mother might quarrel, have problems with Lilja
- this is her mother, sister or family
- so they may become, OR, stop being friends, bad friends, enemies
- (relations) would be bad/good/nice
- because everything will be so much better

STAGE 2: genuine and instrumental concerns for reciprocity/ fairness/fidelity, emergence of concern for welfare of others/care/empathy, genuine normative moral/ emerging conscience concerns, interpersonal concerns and moral feelings

KOHLBERG CRITERION JUDGMENTS:

- Jona/mother has, OR, may do a lot, keep quiet for Lilja in the past/future
- this is Jona's money, she worked for/earned it
- mother would take Jona's money OR not let her go out for a long time
- so the other person will keep a promise to you
- Jona might try to get away with lying/deceive all the time
- Joe will be sad if he doesnt go to camp
- this is none of her business
- parents let children have/do what they want
- parents have done a lot for them

ALTERNATIVE CONTENT UNITS:

Moral Rule/Conscience/Fairness Concerns:

- it's unfair of mother to break the promise/ change her mind
- she doesn't want to deceive, fool or go behind mother's back
- a promise shouldn't be broken, should stick/stand by it
- otherwise she will betray her promise, OR, her sister
- she may feel this is better OR the most right
- betraying makes one feel badly afterwards

Relationship Concerns (authority/sibling):

- mother may have a talk with her (ask her not to do it again
- no one wants to be with you if you're always lying
- it's unpleasant/not nice for sister/mother OR makes her unhappy, sad, angry
- otherwise mother will worry, be afraid for Jona
- so the family/sisters/mother-daughter are in agreement OR everything is good between them
- Lilja is (more) fond of/cares for/feels sorry for sister/mother
- because they are friends/close
- because they get together/talk a lot
- because it is a secret between them

STAGE 2/3: generalized functional normative concerns, emerging mutual (3rd-person perspective) relationship concerns, elaborated moral conscience and feelings

KOHLBERG CRITERION JUDGMENTS:

- others have expectations/looking forward to what promised
- others won't believe OR trust you again
- Jona deserved to go, worked hard for something mother promised
- others help you out in ways you really appreciate
- conscience bothers, OR, hounds you
- mother brought her up, raised, educated her
- he and his father should stick together, help each other

ALTERNATIVE CONTENT UNITS:

Moral Rule/Conscience Concerns:

- bound to your promise
- more convenient to lie because she's only thinking of herself
- clears her conscience not to lie/break a promise
- mother will feel she had not done right, talk of feelings
- Jona will feel bad inside if she realizes she disobeyed

Relationship Concerns (authority/sibling):

- loney if not trusted
- other is hurt if she breaks her promise
- mother doesn't want them lying when she brings them up
- need to talk with each other
- because her sister may learn something by this
- help take care, watch out for sister


Relative Frequencies of Moral Stages
7, 9, and 12 years (N=65)
Relative Frequencies
80
60
40
20
0
1
1-2
2
2-3
3
Stages
LEGEND
7 yrs. (N=20)
9 yrs. (N=20)
12 yrs. (N=25)

Fig. 1

Figure 2 Relative Frequencies of Content Units at Ages 7, 9 and 12 years



Figure 3 Age Specific Distributions of Content Units across Stages (Relative Frequencies)